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POINT I : T H E ACTS OF T H E STATE
ROAD COMMISSION, IN REQUESTING
T H E P L A N N I N G COMMISSION OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY TO D E F E R ACTION ON
T H E F I N A L L I N E N P L A T OF RANDOM
WOODS SUBDIVISION, CONSTITUTED
A TAKING OF D E F E N D A N T S ' PROPERTY, FOR W H I C H COMPENSATION
MUST BE P A I D UNDER T H E F I F T H AND
F O U R T E E N T H AMENDMENTS TO T H E
F E D E R A L CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 7 AND 22 OF T H E CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. I N T E R E S T
SHOULD HAVE BEEN P A I D ON T H E
J U R Y AWARD FROM JANUARY 10, 1961,
T H E DATE D E F E N D A N T S ' PROPERTY
WAS TAKEN BY T H E ROAD COMMISSION.
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POINT I I . I N T H E EVENT T H A T T H E
COURT DOES NOT D E T E R M I N E T H A T
T H E ACTS OF T H E P L A I N T I F F , ROAD
COMMISSION, BEFORE T H E P L A N N I N G
COMMISSION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
I N D E F E R R I N G ACTION ON T H E PROPOSED F I N A L L I N E N P L A T OF RANDOM WOODS SUBDIVISION WAS A TAKING OF D E F E N D A N T S ' PROPERTY,
T H E N , IN T H E ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS ARE E N T I T L E D TO DAMAGES CAUSED BY T H E P L A I N T I F F ,
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D E F E N D A N T S FROM USING T H E I R
P R O P E R T Y FOR 2i/2 YEARS.
P O I N T I I I . D E F E N D A N T S ARE ENT I T L E D TO T H E COST OF T H E ENGINEERING, P L A N N I N G AND DEVELOPING OF T H E F I N A L L I N E N P L A T OF
RANDOM WOODS SUBDIVISION, AS
T H E SAME CONSTITUTES AN IMPROVEMENT TO T H E PROPERTY, UND E R 78-34-10 (1), U.C.A., 1953.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

S T A T E O F U T A H , by and through
its Road Commission,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
No.
10277

vs.
B E T T I L Y O N ' S , INC., and N O L A N
OSWALD,
Defendants and Appellants.

I

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF CASE
This is a condemnation action brought by the State
of Utah, by and through its Road Commission, for
the condemnation of 11 acres of ground located in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, in the vicinity of Knudsen's corner (6200 South and Holladay Blvd.)
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DISPOSITION I N L O W E R COURT
This case was tried to a jury and a verdict for
$130,000.00 was awarded to the Defendants. The Defendants appeal from this verdict.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek additional damages for cost of
platting and planning of the original subdivision, for
expenses incurred by Defendants during a 3 ^ year
period, during which time Defendants were prevented
by acts of the State Road Commission from making
any use of their land, and for interest on the award
from January 10, 1961.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The land involved in this condemnation action is
a 35.75 acre wooded tract (formerly the Auerbach
Estate), located approximately 200 feet East and South
of Knudsen's corner in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah. Throughout this Appeal, the two Defendants
and Appellants, Bettilyon's, Inc., and Nolan Oswald,
shall be referred to collectively, as "Defendants" or,
individually, as "Bettilyon" and "Oswald", and the
Plaintiff, State of Utah, by and through its Road Commission, shall be referred to as either "Plaintiff" or
"Road Commission".
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While other Defendants are shown in various
places in the caption of this action, the trial court determined that the only parties who had any interest in
the proceedings were Bettilyon's, Inc., and Nolan Oswald.
On May 15, 1959, Commerce Investment Company, a Utah Corporation, (later merged into Defendant, Bettilyon's, Inc.), purchased 35.75 acres of
ground under a Real Estate Contract (R 278, Exhibit D 36), for $170,000.00, plus real estate commission. The purchase price was paid as follows: $10,000.00
cash, plus commission; $23,402.00 by assuming a mortgage with Tracy-Collins Trust Company, and the
balance of the purchase price, amounting to $136,598.00
was paid in four annual installments on succeeding
years. Interest was charged on the unpaid contract
balance, at the rate of 4% per annum, commencing May
15, 1959. Interest on the mortgage at Tracy-Collins
Trust Company was charged at the rate of 5% per
annum. The Real Estate Contract, at Paragraph 8
(R 281), required the Buyer to "proceed forthwith"
to develop the ground by the formation of a subdivision. The firm of Bush & Gudgell was immediately
hired to proceed with the engineering and planning
of the subdivision and on June 28, 1960, a Preliminary
Subdivision Plat of the proposed Random Woods Subdivision was presented to the Planning Commission
of Salt Lake County (hereinafter referred to as "Planning Commission") and approved by this body (R 275,
Exhibit D 29-2).
3
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(
On December 8, 1960, the Road Commission took
prfhe first of a series of steps designed to deprive De/ fendants of the beneficial use of their land, without
compensation. Mr. C. Taylor Burton, Director of
Highways, on this date wrote a letter to the Planning
Director of the Salt Lake County Planning Commission. W e quote this letter in full because it clearly
shows the plan the Highway Department consistently
followed during the next 2 ^ years, to prevent any use
of the property in the path of the freeway without
regard to the rights of the owners (R 275, Exhibit
D-29-5):

J"*"

"Utah State Department of Highways
Salt Lake City 14, Utah
December 8, 1960
Mr. Morris E . Johnson
Planning Director
Salt Lake County Planning Commissoin
355 South 200 East Street
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Dear Mr. Johnson:
I n order that steps may be taken to protect
the right-of-way needed for the construction of
the southeast belt route this is to request the Salt
Lake County Planning Commission to restrict
further developments along this route as provided by law. The attached plan shows the alignment.
A 400 ft. right-of-w$y is requested for reservation at this time. This width would be modified as detailed right-of-way plans can be developed. This route has been approved by the
4
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Road Commission and it is anticipated that some
right-of-way purchase may be undertaken within
a year. Although actual date of construction is
dependant upon availability of federal-aid funds
there is some probability that actual construction
may be started within two or three years.
Your assistance in preserving this right-ofway will be appreciated in the interest of keeping
the public investment in this facility at a minimum.
Very truly yours,
/ s / C. Taylor Burton
Director of Highways
JEJ:iw
Attachment:"
(Emphasis added).
In June of I960, Commerce Investment Company
(prior to its merger with Bettilyon's, Inc.), sold an
undivided one-half interest in the subject land to Nolan
Oswald, the other Defendant.
On December 13, 1960, Defendants presented the
final linen plat (Exhibit D 6) of the proposed Random
Woods Division to the Planning Commission and action
was deferred until January 10, 1961. The minutes of
this meeting, relating to this transaction, are as follows: (R 275, Exhibit D 29-6) :
"Mr. Johnson pointed out that the State Road
Commission has indicated they would put an
interchange near or in the location of this subdivision; that perhaps they will need all of this
area for this purpose. Bush and Gudgell requested that disposition be tabled until the next
Planning Commission meeting. By motion sec-
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onded and unanimously passed the Planning
Commission tabled decision of Random Woods
Subdivision, 6300 South 2900 East, until the
next meeting, January 10, 1961." (Epmasis
added).
On December 20, 1960, Henry C. Helland, Chief
Planning and Programming Engineer, Utah State
Department of Highways, wrote a letter to the Planning Commission and the second and last paragraphs
of this letter are quoted (R 275, Exhibit D 29-7):
" I t is noted from the small zoning map enclosed in your letter that the Random Woods
Subdivision near Knudsen's Corner was given
preliminary approval. The Belt Route location
in this area would take a considerable portion
of the northwest corner of this subdivision."
"We are very much aware of the problems
confronting the Commission and also realize that
right-of-way costs are increasing daily. Because
of this you can be assured that every effort will
be made to expedite this work and furnish you
with a map and legal description of the route
at the earliest possible date in order that you may
use whatever legal means available to you to
protect the right-of-way from new building encroachments or other development." (Emphasis
added).
On January 10, 1961, at its regular meeting ,the
Planning Commission denied approval of the Random
Woods Subdivision final linen subdivision plat. The
minutes of this meeting relating to this transaction are
as follows (R 275, Exhibit D 29-9) :
6
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"Random Woods Subdivision, 6300 South
2900 East, falls partially within the right-ofway requested by the State Road Commission for
the Belt Route. By motion seconded and unanimously passed the Planning Commission deferred approval of this final plat until one year from
this date, with the understanding that should the
State Department of Highways find before that
date that all or part of this subdivision will not
be needed for the Belt Route, the Planning Commission would consider this subdivision, or parts
thereof, for approval at that time." (Emphasis
added).
On January 16, 1961, in a letter to Roscoe Boden,
County Surveyor, Mr. Douglas H . Campbell, Assistant
Director of the Planning Commission, stated (R 275,
Exhibit D 29-10):
"The linen plat of Random Woods Subdivison was considered for final approval at the
Planning Commission meeting on January 10,
1961. The Planning Commission has received
plats of the proposed alignment of the Interstate Belt Roue with a request from the State
Road Commission that this right-of-way be protected as much as possible."
On November 15, 1961, Mr. C. Taylor Burton,
Director of Highways, wrote to the Salt Lake County
Commission, as follows (R 275, Exhibit D 29-11) :

7
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"Utah State Department of Highways
Salt Lake City 14, Utah
November 15, 1961
Salt Lake County Commission
City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
S U B J E C T : Salt Lake Belt Route - 1-215 &
1-415
Gentlemen:
Previously we advised you as to the tentative
location of the Belt Highway in the Southeast
quadrant and requested you to reserve this rightof-way. Since that time, we have made definitive
right-of-way plans which indicate the exact area
required for the construction of the Belt Route.
Attach find drawings showing the location of
the Belt Route in the Southeast quadrant.
It is requested that you zone the right-ofway shown on the attached drawings to preclude
the further construction in these areas.
Very truly yours,
/ s / C. Taylor Burton
C. T A Y L O R B U R T O N
Director of Highways
Enclosure"
(Emphasis added).
This letter is quoted to show the continuing attitude
of the Road Commission in attempting to preserve the
right-of-way throughout the entire period covered by
this matter.
From the date of December 7, 1960 (the time the
Planning Commission first indicated that the Random
Woods Subdivision Plat would not be approved), to
8
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September 25, 1961, Mr. B. Lue Bettilyon, President
of Bettilyon's, Inc., was i^^ffl^g^i- contact with officials of the Road Commission in an attempt to expedite
matters, so that Plaintiff would be able to determine
how much of Defendants' land would be required by
the Road Commission (R 25 to 27), but it was not
until February, 1962 (T 228), more than one year
after the final linen plat was refused by the Planning
Commission, that the Road Commission was able to
present the first preliminary drawings (with tentative
approval by the Bureau of Public Roads), of the interchange to be constructed on Defendants' ground. This
was the first time that either Plaintiff or Defendants
knew how much of the land would be required by the
State.
From October 26, 1961 to July 30, 1962, Mr. B.
Lue Bettilyon was in contact with the officials of the
Right-of-Way Department, in an attempt to get them
to make an offer of settlement on the ground that was
being taken by the Road Commission (R 27-29), but
even as late as September 1, 1962, the State had not
even made an offer for the purchase of this land that
they would require.
On July 30, 1962, Mr. B. Lue Bettilyon wrote
a letter (R 16) to C. Taylor Burton, explaining that
Defendants had payments to make on the ground in
excess of $79,000.00 and requested the State to make
a partial payment of $40,000.00 on the eventual purchase of the ground. On September 4, 1962 (R 20 and
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29), the State made a partial payment of $40,000.00
to Defendants.
The State finally made its first offer on the land
they were taking early in 1963 (T 241-2), more than
two years after the Plenning Commission had refused
to approve the final linen plat of Random Woods Subdivision.
Thereafter, the parties negotiated for approximately two months, but were unable to reach agreement upon the price to be paid and, finally, to force
the State to commence condemnation action, Defendants appeared before the Planning Commission on May
28, 1963, and requested approval of the final linen plat
of Random Woods Subdivision. The minutes of this
meeting (R 275, Exhibit D 29-16) show that the plat
was approved and on July 22, 1963, the State finally
served Summons and Complaint in this action.
The land involved in this condemnation proceeding
is quite heavily wooded with natural trees and, in one
spot, a large old orchard. There are some open spots,
as indicated on Exhibit D 4. Mr. B. Lue Bettilyon
testified (T 171-2) that there was no use to which the
ground could be used from January, 1961 to July,
1963, except for subdivision purposes; that the homes
were not suitable for rental; that the orchard was too
old for farming and, in addition, that the ground could
not be used for agricultural purposes because of the
wooded nature of the ground and, also, because there
was no irrigation water available for this use.
10
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I n the planning and development of the Preliminary and final Random Woods Subdivision Plats,
Defendants incurred the following expenses (R 72 and
R 31): $3,893.25 for engineering expenses (Bush &
Gudgell and County Surveyor) ; $1,996.25 paid to
employees of Bettilyon's, Inc., for work and labor on
the planning of this subdivision (Note: the Findings
of Fact (R 72) indicate $1,296.25, but the Exhibits
at (R 300-303, Exhibit D 37) and the testimony of
B. Lue Bettilyon at T 168-G, which was uncontroverted, indicates the total sum of $1,996.25) ; $160.02,
signs for the subdivision roads and photos used in the
planning and development of the subdivision—or a
total of $6,049.52 spent in developing the final subdivision linen plat.
During the period of January 10, 1961 and July
22, 1963, Defendants also incurred expenses caused
by the delay of the State in preventing the development
of the subdivision (R 300-301, Exhibit 37) and
(Amendment Findings of Fact (R 71)) as follows:
Real property taxes on property eventually taken by
the State of Utah), $1,189.20; $200.00 for water connection required to bring water into a Caretaker's
house (if the subdivision had been developed, this expense would have been reimbursed by Salt Lake City);
$904.90 for water bills from Salt Lake City for water
used at the premises during the period mentioned above;
(this expense would not have been incurred except for
the delay) $178.00 required for the removal of a dead
tree that was endangering neighbor's property. This
11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tree would have been removed during the course of
development of the subdivision by equipment already
on the site, if the subdivision had proceeded according
to plan, but subsequent windstorms required that it
be removed at the expense indicated; $290.25 for fire
insurance premiums on the buildings on the property,
for a total of $2,762.35.
I n addition to the above expenses, Defendants paid
$3,781.73 as interest to Tracy-Collins Trust Company
on the mortgage on the property and the sum of
$7,182.15 as interest to Security Title Company, on
the unpaid balance on the purchase contract, or a tota]
of $10,963.88 interest paid for the acquisition on the
land and the interest computation on invested capital
in the real property amounted to $18,329.07 (R 33-4
and 73 A ) and (R 302-303, Exhibit 37).
In summary, on January 10, 1961, the Planning
Commission denied approval of the final linen plat.
2 % years later, on July 22, 1963, the State filed this
condemnation action and the final Order of Condemnation was entered on August 31, 1964, making a total
delay of more than 2 ^ years.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
P O I N T I. T H E A C T S O F T H E S T A T E
ROAD COMMISSION, I N R E Q U E S T I N G T H E
P L A N N I N G COMMISSION OF SALT L A K E
C O U N T Y TO D E F E R A C T I O N ON T H E F I NAL L I N E N P L A T OF RANDOM WOODS
12
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SUBDIVISION, CONSTITUTED A TAKING
OF D E F E N D A N T S ' P R O P E R T Y , F O R
W H I C H COMPENSATION MUST BE P A I D
UNDER T H E F I F T H AND F O U R T E E N T H
AMENDMENTS TO T H E F E D E R A L CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS
7 AND 22 OF T H E CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH. I N T E R E S T SHOULD HAVE BEEN
P A I D ON T H E J U R Y AWARD FROM JANUARY 10, 1961, T H E DATE D E F E N D A N T S '
PROPERTY WAS TAKEN BY T H E ROAD
COMMISSION.
POINT II. IN T H E EVENT THAT T H E
COURT DOES NOT D E T E R M I N E T H A T
T H E ACTS OF T H E P L A I N T I F F , ROAD
COMMISSION, BEFORE T H E P L A N N I N G
COMMISSION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, IN
D E F E R R I N G ACTION ON T H E PROPOSED
F I N A L L I N E N P L A T OF RANDOM WOODS
SUBDIVISION WAS A TAKING OF DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY, T H E N , IN T H E
ALTERNATIVE, D E F E N D A N T S ARE EN
T I T L E D TO DAMAGES CAUSED BY T H E
P L A I N T I F F , ROAD COMMISSION, IN PREVENTING D E F E N D A N T S FROM USING
T H E I R PROPERTY FOR sy2 YEARS.
POINT I I I . D E F E N D A N T S ARE ENT I T L E D TO T H E COST OF T H E ENGINEERING, PLANNING AND DEVELOPING OF
13
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T H E F I N A L L I N E N P L A T OF RANDOM
WOODS SUBDIVISION, AS T H E SAME CONSTITUTES AN IMPROVEMENT TO T H E
PROPERTY, UNDER 78-34-10 (1), U.C.A. 1953.

ARGUMENT
P O I N T I. T H E ACTS OF T H E STATE
ROAD COMMISSION, IN REQUESTING T H E
P L A N N I N G COMMISSION OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY TO D E F E R ACTION ON T H E F I NAL L I N E N P L A T OF RANDOM WOODS
SUBDIVISION, CONSTITUTED A TAKING
OF D E F E N D A N T S ' P R O P E R T Y , F O R
W H I C H COMPENSATION MUST BE P A I D
UNDER T H E F I F T H AND F O U R T E E N T H
AMENDMENTS TO T H E F E D E R A L CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS
7 AND 22 OF T H E CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH. I N T E R E S T SHOULD HAVE B E E N
P A I D ON T H E J U R Y AWARD FROM JANUARY 10, 1961, T H E D A T E D E F E N D A N T S '
P R O P E R T Y WAS TAKEN BY T H E ROAD
COMMISSION.
This case presents an unusual factual situation
which, as far as we can determine, has not yet been
presented to this Court.
The Road Commission, in accomplishing its aims
of keeping the cost of the Right-of-Way as low as pos14
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sible, made use of a Salt Lake County Ordinance as
amended, which provides in part: 9-7-3, Parks, School
Sites and Other Public Spaces:
"(1) Provisions for Public Use.
When a preliminary plat is submitted for the
division of property a part or all of which is
deemed suitable by the Planning Commission
for schools, parks, playgrounds, or other areas
for public use, the Planning Commission shall
apprise the proper agency in writing of the property owner's intent to subdivide. If any such
areas proposed for public use have not been
freely dedicated to the public by the owner or
have not been purchased at a fair price by the
proper agency within one (1) year from the date
of notification, such areas may be divided into
lots and sold in accordance with the provisions
of this Title."
The letter of December 8, 1960, addressed to
Morris E . Johnson, Planning Director, Salt Lake
County Planning Commission, signed by C. Taylor
Burton, the Chief Executive Officer of the Road Commission, sets the stage and indicates the attitude of the
Department of Highways, regarding the acquisition of
Defendant's land. In this letter, Mr. Burton says:
"Steps must be taken to protect the
Right-of-Way"
and requested that the Commission "restrict development/' H e asked that 400 feet be reserved, at that time,
to be "modified" (narrowed) at a later time, and then,
in the final paragraph, summarizes the position of the
Road Commission: "Your assistance in preserving this
15
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Right-of-Way will be appreciated in the interest of
keeping the public investment in this facility at a minimum" (Emphasis added.) Several months later (on
November 15, 1961), Mr. Burton stated, in a letter
addressed to the Salt Lake County Commission: "Previously we advised you as to the tentative location of the
Belt Highway in the Southeast quadrant and requested
you to reserve this right-of-way" In the same letter, he
requested: "that you zone the right-of-way shown on the
attached drawings to preclude the further construction
in these areas" (Emphasis added.) Other letters of a
similar vein, were written by other officials of the Road
Commission, as set out in the Statement of Facts.
On January 10, 1961, the Planning Commission
of Salt Lake County deferred action on the final linen
plat of Random Woods Subdivision and this was done
solely at the request and instance of the State Road
Commission and the sole purpose was to prevent the
property from being put to any benefiicial use by the
landowner, by further development of a subdivision and
to prevent construction of homes in the path of the freeway and thereby to substantially reduce the cost of rightof-way acquisition.
I n this respect, the testimony given at the trial,
indicates that the acts of the Road Commission in stopping the development of the Random Woods Subdivision saved the State of Utah approximately $800,000.00. Exhibits D 7, 8, 9 and 10 indicate that approximately 20 lots in the proposed subdivision were taken
16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by the State for freeway purposes and homes having
an average value of $40,000.00 would have been constructed on these lots over the 2 % years prior to the
commencement of the condemnation action (T 172).
But even if, for the sake of argument, we say that only
five or ten homes would have been constructed during
that time, a tremendous savings was effected for the
state. The value of one house is greatly in excess of the
interest on the award that Defendants are claiming.
In view of the already high cost of freeway construction and limited funds available therefor, this was,
and is, a worthy accomplishment (and we do not disagree with the results) — so long as the rights of the
individual are safeguarded and private property is not
taken without compensation.
Our point of view is expressed by this Court in the
case of Springville Banking Co. vs. Burton, 10 Utah
(2d), 100; 349 P ( 2 d ) 157 (at page 158) :
"On the other hand, if public officials act arbitrarily and unreasonably, causing, for example,
total destruction of the means to get in and out
of one's property, without any reasonable justification for doing so in the public interest, in a
manner that imposes a special burden on one
not shared by the public generally, principles of
equity no doubt could be invoked to prevent
threatened action of such character or to remove
any instrumentality born of such conduct. Plaintiff did not allege or assert anything akin thereto." (Emphasis added).
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There is little difference in the "total destruction
of the means to get in and out of one's property," and
the total prevention of any beneficial use of property,
and there is no reason why one property owner should
stand the entire burden that results in such an exceedingly great savings for the public in general.
The property in question (on January 10, 1961),
as indicated in the Statement of Facts above, had only
one use and that was for the development of a subdivision. When the Defendants were deprived of that
use, there was an effective definite taking of Defendants'
property, on that date.
The date of valuation of property in a condemnation action is set by statute as the date on which Summons is served (78-34-11, UCA, 1953), which, in this
case, was July 22, 1963. This Court has consistently
held that interest is allowed on the Judgment, either
from the date of taking or, if there is no taking, then
from the date the final award is made (Oregon Short
Line R. Co. vs. Jones, 29 Utah, 147; 80 P 732; State
vs. Peek, 1 Utah (2d), 263; 265 P (2d), 630.
In the instant case, the District Court allowed interest from the date of Judgment, but Defendants have
consistently maintained throughout this trial that on
the date the County Planning Commission refused to
approve the final linen plat of Random Woods Subdivision, there was a taking of Defendants' property.
Therefore, the issue to be resolved by this Court is:
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What Constitutes a Taking and When Did the Taking
Take Place in this Case?
2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, page 367 (paragraph 6.1(1)), states as follows:
"It. is well settled that a taking of property
within the meaning of the constitution may
be accomplished without formally
divesting
the owner of his title to the property or of any
interest therein. Any limitation on the free use
and enjoyment of property constitutes a taking
of property within the meaning of the constitutional provision." (Emphasis added).
Also, we read at page 372:
"Constitutional rights rest on substance, not
on form, and the liability to pay compensation
for property taken cannot be evaded by leaving
the title in the owner, while depriving him of the
beneficial use of the property. I t has already been
shown that a legal restriction upon the use of
land may constitute a taking, although the title
is unaffected and the land is physically untouched, and the same is true when the owner's
enjoyment of the land is physically interfered
with, although his legal rights remain unimpaired." (Emphasis added).
The U.S. Court of Claims, in the case of L. L.
Richards vs. U.S., 282 Fed R (2) 901 (at page 904)
in ruling on an invasion of Defendants' ground by
raising the subterranean water table, stated:
"We reiterate what we said in Cotton Land
Co v. United States, 75 F . Supp. 232, 109 Ct.
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CI. 816, that it is not necessary to show that the
defendant intended to take plaintiff's land; all
that plaintiff need show is that the taking of its
land was the natural and probable consequence
of the acts of the defendant. I t is not even necessary for plaintiff to show that defendant was
aware of the taking of an interest in its property
would result from its acts. I t is only necessary
to show that this was in fact the natural and
J~s probable consequence of them,
/^

"In the instant case it appears that defendant
in fact knew that there would be seepage and
an accumulation of water unless it was carried
off in some way. The only thing defendant did
not know was where it would accumulate. I t
knew someone's land might be affected, but not
whose. If it were necessary to show an intent—
but it is not—an intent to commit acts that would
probably result in the taking of some land jkas
been shown. The particular land that might be
taken was not within the control of defendant,
but depended upon the laws of nature; but defendant did contemplate the possible taking of
an interest in that land to which the forces of
nature directed the accumultaion of water caused
by its acts.
"We must hold that plaintiff's injury was the
natural consequences of defendants act, and that
the defendant has taken a seepage easement
under and through plaintiffs3 property/' (Emphasis added).

In case of Gerlach Livestock Co. vs. U.S., 76 F .
Supp. 87 (at page 97), the Court quoted from the
Supreme Court Decision in the case of Portsmouth
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Harbor Land & Hotel Co. vs. United States, 260 U.S.
327, 43 S.Ct. 135, 137, 67 L.Ed. 287, and says:
"Plaintiffs (in the Portsmouth case) alleged
that the Government had installed a battery and
a fire control tower on lands to the rear of plaintiffs' lands, and that the guns from this battery
could be fired only over plaintiffs' lands, and
it was alleged that the defendant intended to do
so at ^jill. The court said:
< * * * If the United States, with the Admitted intent to fire across the claimants' land
at will should fire a single shot or put a fire
control upon the land, it well might be that the
taking of a right would be complete. But even
when, the intent thus to make use of the claimants' property is not admitted, while a single act
may r^ot be enough, a continuance of them in
sufficient number and for a sufficient time may
prove it. Every successive trespass adds to the
force of the evidence. The establishment of a
fire control is an indication of an abiding purpose.'
"We think the reasoning behind this decision
furnishes a guide for the determination of the
time of the taking. That time, it would seem,
comes whenever the defendant's intent to take
has been definitely asserted and it begins to carry
out that intent. So long as it is conjectural
whether or not defendant will actually take plaintiff's property, a taking has not occurred, but
when conjecture ripens into a definitely asserted
purpose and steps are taken to carry out that
purpose, the taking may be said to have occur
red." (Emphasis added).
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The effect of filing a map or a plan by governmental
agency, under the ordinance referred to above, is discussed in 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 383, paragraph
6.12, as follows:
"The mapping out of streets upon vacant land
near large and growing cities has often been
provided for, so that a systematic plan for the
gradual enlargement of the city can be followed.
A mere provision that after the recording of
the map no streets shall be laid out which are
not in accordance therewith is unobjectionable;
but it is sometimes enacted that if the owner
builds upon the land marked out for a street,
when the street is actually laid out he shall receive
no compensation for his building. As the platting of a street under such a statute amounts
substantially to a deprivation of the owner's use
of the land within the limits of the projected
street for any but temporary purposes, it is generally held that such statutes are unconstitutional unless the owner is compensated for his
loss/' (Emphasis added).
A t page 386 of the same volume, the author says:
"The mere passage of legislation authorizing
the acquisition of property by eminent domain
is ordinarily not sufficient, in and of itself, to
constitute a taking. Where, however, the provisions of the statute and the circumstances under
which the appropriation is to take place are such
as to indicate that the purpose of the law was to
effect a taking by virtue of the statute itself, it
has been held that a statute may be so construed
as to vest title in the condemnor upon the mere
passage of the law" (Emphasis added).
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The invoking of an ordinance such as the one
quoted above, can have but one effect and one purpose
and this is, to prevent and owner from enjoying the
beneficial use of his property and, therefore, when used,
clearly constitutes a taking of the property, which must
be paid for under our Federal and State Constitutions.
There are numerous cases that agree with this principle, including our own Courts. One early Utah case
is, Fisher, et al vs. Bountiful City, 21 Utah 29; 59 P
520. In this case, the Legislature had passed a law
giving a city the right to control water and water courses
in the city, for city use. In the furtherance of this legislation, the city had passed an ordinance to implement it,
and thereby took over the control of water that was
previously under the sole control of the Plaintiffs. The
Court says:
". . . Under Section 16, the city has the control
of water and water courses leading to the city,
and may regulate and control the same within
the city, provided such control shall not be exercised to the injury of any right already acquired by the actual owners. This provision was
clearly intended to protect the owner in his right
to water already acquired. The right referred
to carried with it such authority and dominion
as the owner then and formerly had to the full
control, supervision and use of the water belonging to him, without the exercise of the dominion,
supervision, management, control, or the right
to the distribution thereof by the city, or any
other authority, except it emanated from the
owner, it was a plain declaration that the right
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to private property and private ownership of
water should not be taken away from a citizen
without just compensation, and that such right
should be respected and protected in the owner.
The right to own property carries with it the
right to exercise dominion and control over it.
When the dominion, control, and management
of one's property is taken away from him, the
right to private property is violated. To take
away the dominion and control over property is
to take the property itself; for the absolute right
to property includes the right of dominion, control, and the management thereof/' (Emphasis
added).
A similar factual situation was ruled on by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the case of Miller, et
ux, vs. City of Beaver Falls, 368 P a 168; 82 Atlantic
(2), 34, where the city laid out a plat for a park and
provided that no buildings or structures that were constructed in a proposed park, during a three-year period,
would receive compensation. I n other words, the use
of the land was frozen for a three-year period. The Court
held that the act of plotting and freezing of the ground
for three years was a taking, which would be in violation
of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The Court
said, at page 37:
"The action of the City of Beaver Falls in
plotting this ground for a park or playground
and freezing it for three years, is, in reality, a
taking of property by possibility, contingency,
blockade and subterfuge, in violation of the clear
mandate of our Constitution that property can-
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not be taken or injured or applied to public use
without just compensation having been first made
and secured. The contention of the City in this
case, if adopted, would make a travesty of the
constitutional provisions protecting rights of
property."
In another case, Atton vs. City of Rochester, 197
New York Supp (2d), 302, the City passed a Zoning
Ordinance prohibiting the Plaintiff's land from being
used for heavy industry. The evidence indicated that
because of the location of the property, fronting on a
River and because the area surrounding Plaintiff's property was all used for heavy or commercial use, that the
Palintiff was precluded from using the property for
residential or hardly any other purpose, other than commercial use. The Court stated (at page 306):
"An ordinance which permanently so restricts
the use of property that it cannot be used for
any other reasonable purpose goes, it is plain,
beyond regulation, and must be recognized as
a taking of the property."
I t is clear, from these cases, and numerous others,
that the "taking" can be non-physical or constructive.
This rule is cited in 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain,
page 407, paragraph 6.3:
"The modern and prevailing view is that any
subtantial interference with private property
which destroys or lessens its value, or by which
the owner's right to its use or enjoyment is in
any substantial degree abridged or destroyed,
is, in fact and in law, a "taking" in the con-
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stitutional sense, to the extent of the damages
suffered, even though the title and possession
of the owner remains undisturbed."
A t page 409, the author says:
" . . . The broader view, which now obtains
generally, conceives property to be the interest
of the owner in the thing owned, and the ownership to afford the owner the rights of use, exclusion and disposition. Under this broad construction there need not be a physical taking
of the property or even dispossession; any substantial interference with the elemental rights
growing out of ownership of private property
is considered a taking."
I n the Oregon Shortline R. Co. vs. Jones case,
cited above, at page 734, Justice Straup gives an exhaustive well-written opinion on the matter of payment of
interest. I n this case, apparently vacant ground was
involved and Defendants claimed interest from the date
Summons was served and the rule of law was set that
has been consistently followed to the present time: That
interest is paid only from the date of taking or date of
entry of Judgment. Concerning the matter of an
"actual" taking or a "constructive" taking, Justice
Straup said:
"In determining the claim to interest, much
depends upon when, in the proceedings, the
taking of the property took place. While the
law is most exacting that private property shall
not be taken without compensation, still the
condemner is not required to make that compensation until he does take, either actually or
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constructively. The cases cited by appellants
on what constitutes a taking are not pertinent
to the matter of inquiry. In earlier times it was
held that property could be deemed to be taken,
within the meaning of constitutional provisions,
only when the owner was wholly deprived of its
possession, use, and occupation. But a more
liberal doctrine has long been established, and
an actual, physical taking of property is not
necessary to entitle its owner to compensation.
A man's property may be taken, within the
meaning of constitutional provisions such as
ours, although his title and possession remain
undisturbed. To deprive him of the ordinary
beneficial use and enjoyment of his property
is, in law, equivalent to the taking of it, and
is as much a taking as though the property itself were actually taken . . . The question as to
whether appellants are entitled to compensation
for property injuriously affected or damaged,
though not actually occupied or to be occupied,
as illustrated by the cases cited by them, does
not here arise. And if it had arisen, such claim
is conclusively answered in their favor by express terms in the Constitution and in the statute.
The material point, therefore, here, is not, was
there a taking? for such fact must be conceded
by everyone, but, when did the taking occur?
For it is with respect to the time of the taking
that compensation, under the Constitution, must
be made."
In this case, Justice Straup is here discussing the
question of the difference between "taking" and "damage," as appears in the Utah Constitution, and the construction of the word "taking" as it appears in the Federal Constitution, and some of the other State Constitu-
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tions (see the discussion on this subject appearing
under Point I I below). But, clearly, this statement also
has reference to the question involved in this case:
"When Did the Taking Occur," and the fact there can
be a "constructive taking" of property, without the
governmental agency entering upon the land of the
Defendants or disturbing their otherwise possessory
right.
The Oregon Shortline case is cited by a 1953 Utah
Supreme Court case — State, by and through its Engineering Commission, et al vs. Peek (cited above), where
the Court upholds the same rule; that is, that interest is
paid from date of taking or date of Judgment.
I n the opening statement, at page 632, after setting
out the facts, the Court makes this broad statement:
"Appellants are not entitled to interest on the
Judgment prior to the time when actual possession was taken, this Court has uniformly so
held."
Then, the Court cites the Oregon Shortline case.
While the words "actual possession" were used, we feel
this was obiter dictum and is not binding upon this
Court, since the matter of actual possession was not
before the Court; the Defendants were asking interest
from the date of service of Summons.
I n addition, to further illustrate this point, the
opinion then goes on, at page 634, to quote from the
Oregon Shortline case. These words are used:
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"The court in that case conceded that property
might be damaged by a public improvement although not actually taken, in which case the
owner would be entitled to damages, it being
held that Section 3599 fixed "the time with reference to which compensation is to be computed,
rather than fixing the time of the taking, or
when the property shall be deemed to have been
taken/' " (Emphasis added).
I t is interesting and important to note and the record is replete with evidence, that the Defendants fully
cooperated with the State Road Commission with the
aim of an early termination of the matter. I t was only
after negotiations failed, after more than 2 % years of
waiting, that Defendants forced the issue, by having
the subdivision plat approved (R 275, Exhibit D 2918), which act finally resulted in the State commencing
this condemnation action. The Defendants cooperated
with the State because they, as almost all citizens, are
interested in the Road Building Program, and because
they felt they would eventually be fairly compensated
for the land taken by the State of Utah.
There were other courses of action open to the
Defendants. For example, they could have commenced
an action to Mandamus the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission to approve the final linen plat of Random
Woods Subdivision, with the ultimate aim of testing
the constitutionality of the County Ordinance, under
which these acts were taken. However, under the calendar of the District Court of Salt Lake County and the
calendar of this Court, it would have been a minimum
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of two years before a determination could have been
made and, irrespective of the result, Defendants would
have been in about the same position that they were in
when the State finally filed Summons and Complaint.
Also, under the interpretation of County Ordinance
9-1-8(8) and 5-1-1 et seq., two building permits will be
issued on a large tract of land before requiring a subdivision to be approved and recorded. Therefore, in spite
of the fact that the linen plat had been deferred for one
year, Defendants could have obtained two building permits and constructed two homes upon the land in the
path of the freeway. This, certainly, would have been an
act of bad faith but perfectly legal and, without question, under the provisions of 78-34-11, UCA, 1953,
Defendants would have been fully compensated for the
reasonable value of such homes so constructed.
I n view of the extreme cost that has been incurred
by Defendants, resulting from this delay, would this
have been a proper action? W e think not, nor do we feel
that a Mandamus action with the resulting expense
to the State, County and Defendants was necessary or
the proper action.
I t is a fair question to ask: Why the State Road
Commission did not proceed in an orderly manner under
the procedures set up by our statute (78-34-9, UCA,
1963) for an Order of Occupancy? This would have
stopped construction; it would have insured the reduced
cost of acquisition of right-of-way; in fact, it would have
accomplished all of the things set out by Mr. C. Taylor
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Burton and other officials of the Road Commission in
their various letters to the Planning Commission, but
there are obvious reasons why the State did not use this
judicial procedure. First, the State did not even know
how much, if any, of Defendants' land was needed.
Therefore, they could not describe, with certainty, the
property to be taken as required under 78-34-6 and 9,
UCA, 1953. Secondly, and more important in the eyes
of the State Road Commission, they would have been
obligated to pay for the land much sooner than they
otherwise did, and there would have been no question as
to the obligation of the State to pay interest from the
date the Order of Immediate Occupancy was entered.
All of these things were realized by the officials of the
State Road Commission.
Does the fact that the Road Commission chose to
proceed under an Administrative Order of the Planning
Commission of Salt Lake County, rather than seeking
judicial authority vested in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, change the factual situation? Does it
change the legal rights or obligations involved? W e see
no difference and we add, by way of comparison, that
even the status of the legal title under either of the two
procedures, remains the same. Under the Order of Occupancy, the owner retains the fee title and loses his
possessory right. Under the Administrative Order, the
landowner loses the beneficial use of the property which,
we submit, is only loss of possession, and the title is
finally passed with the final Order of Condemnation
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entered in this case. There is one other great distinction
— if the Plaintiff had proceeded under the Complaint
and Order of Occupancy, it would have been required to
set forth, with particularity, the amount of Defendants'
ground that it intended to use and, eventually, purchase.
Under the Administrative Order, the State effectively
tied up all of Defendants' ground for 2 ^ years, until
it was finally determined how much would be required
and, it is to be noted, Defendants are not now asking
compensation for the delay caused by their being unable
to use the balance of their land.
There is one additional point that should be considered on this matter. On September 4, 1962 (R 20
and 29), at the request of the Defendants, the State
Road Commission made a partial payment to the Defendants, in the amount of $40,000.00. This was prior
to any negotiation for the purchase and prior to any
attempt being made to establish valuation. This clearly
shows the attitude of the State Road Commission —
that it had intended, by its acts, to deprive Defendants
of the beneficial use of their property; that they had,
in fact, taken the property and it was only a question
of determining the purchase price to be paid therefor.
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CONCLUSION
From these facts and from the law cited, Defendants feel that there can be only one conclusion — that
the Plaintiff took Defendants' land on January 10,
1961 and that interest should be computed from that
date, on the award of $130,000.00 (less a credit for
$40,000.00, paid on September 4, 1962), at the rate of
6% per annum.
POINT II. IN T H E EVENT T H A T T H E
COURT DOES NOT D E T E R M I N E T H A T
T H E ACTS OF T H E P L A I N T I F F , ROAD
COMMISSION, B E F O R E T H E P L A N N I N G
COMMISSION OF SALT L A K E COUNTY, IN
D E F E R R I N G A C T I O N ON T H E P R O P O S E D
F I N A L L I N E N P L A T OF RANDOM WOODS
SUBDIVISION WAS A TAKING OF DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY, THEN, IN T H E
ALTERNATIVE, D E F E N D A N T S ARE ENT I T L E D TO D A M A G E S C A U S E D B Y T H E
P L A I N T I F F , ROAD COMMISSION, I N P R E VENTING DEFENDANTS FROM USING
T H E I R P R O P E R T Y F O R sy2 Y E A R S .
The District Court made a finding of fact (R 7274 A ) , listing the claims of the Defendants for damages
caused by preventing Defendants use of the property
for more than 3 % years. These damages consisted of
interest paid on the contract and mortgage balances
in the amount of $10,963.88; interest paid on capital
invested in the purchase of the land, $18,349.07 (credit
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was allowed for the $40,000.00 paid by the State); real
property taxes paid by Defendants on the ground eventually taken by the State, in the amount of $1,189.20,
and other miscellaneous items set out in the Findings
and explained in the Statement of Facts, amounting
to $1,608.25, for total damages amounting to $32,110.40.
The Amended Conclusions of Law (R, 74 A-75)
states:
"3. That such claims, as submitted, are separate and independent causes of action unrelated
to any issue of evaluation and damage compensable in the eminent domain proceedings."
This paragraph infers that the claims of the Defendants are possibly valid and just, but that Defendants
have no standing in this Court to adjudicate them.
Article 1, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution
states:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
I n the case of State vs. District Court, Fourth
Judicial District, 78 P ( 2 d ) , 502, Justice Wolfe, in the
dissenting opinion, gives an exhaustive treatise on the
meaning of the words "taken or damaged," as they
appear in the section quoted above. The main opinion,
in that case, has been overruled for all practical purposes
(see Hjorth vs. Wittenburg, 121 Utah 324; 241 P (2d)
907; State of Utah, by and through its Engineering
Commission vs. Fred Tedesco, 4 Utah (2d) 3 1 ; 286 P
(2d) 785; Springville Banking Co., vs. Burton (cited
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above); Fairclough vs. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah
(2d), 417; 354 P (2d) 105; State vs. Parker, 13 Utah
(2d) 65; 368 P (2d) 585. For all intents and purposes,
the dissenting opinion of Justice Wolfe, has been accepted in total by all of these later decisions.
The holding of the dissenting opinion of Justice
Wolfe and the later cases, cited above, can be summarized as follows: When there is no actual taking of
the landowner's property, but only damage (referred
to by these cases as "consequential damage"), the State
cannot be enjoined from proceeding with a project, nor
can the State be sued for damages — the principle of
sovereign immunity standing as a bar to these suits.
The word "damaged" in this section of the Constitution,
gives rise to a substantive right that is not self-executing; that is, does not give rise to a procedural right.
This must be done by the Legislature, which has provided that in case of redress for consequential damage,
application must be made to the Board of Examiners,
as stated by Justice Wolfe, at page 522:
" I conclude, therefore, that when the State
is the real party which has caused damages in
pursuit of its lawful business through one of its
agencies not acting negligently, the sufferers
of that damage must resort to the Board of Examiners for redress, and that such is due process
under our Constitution and the Constitution of
the United States."
However, Justice Wolfe concludes his opinion with
the following statement, at page 524:
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"On the side of the line where acts done in
pursuance of an authorized objective are not
authorized, are all those cases which involve an
actual taking of property. The State Road Commissioners do not act within their authorization
when they attempt to build a road over my property without acquiring it or arranging for compensation. But, ordinarily, when they do not
physically take any property, but only improve
or build on the State's own highway, which is
one of the purposes of their existence, they act
within their authority, and any consequential
damage which may incidentally occur or be
caused by such acts does not divest them of
authority. It is true that they may in some cases
so raise a grade or build a viaduct or do some
other act on the State's highway which, while
not actually intruding on the property of another, may cause such a serious interference wit]t
the enjoyment of that abutting property as to
amount to a 'taking3 . . .
"Thus it is true that in the transition from consequential damages to damages from actual
trespass there may come a point before actual
trespass where practically the entire usefulness
of a building or lot is destroyed, as where a street
is raised to a point practically contiguous to the
upper window of a home. This has, as said before,
caused the courts in the old cases where municipalities and public service corporations have used
the streets to call a substantial injury to property
a "taking" within the meaning of the condemnation statutes." (Emphasis added).
This case presents a factual situation that falls
within the rule cited by Justice Wolfe. Here, the State
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fendants from proceeding with the development of their
subdivision. There is, or was, no other use for which
the ground could be used. These acts destroyed the
entire usefulness of the property for 2 % years, until
the State finally commenced condemnation proceedings
and another year before these proceedings were completed, or a total of 3 % years.
An analogy might be drawn to the factual situation
set out in the State vs. Parker case, cited above. In that
case, the Defendant attempted to Cross-Claim in a
condemnation action against the State, for damages
caused by the construction of a freeway to other property not involved in that condemnation action. Justice
Henriod stated, at page 587, ". . . on numerous occasions, we have held that such damage is not recoverable
because of the State's immunity," (citing the above
cases). This is not the factual situation in this case.
Here, damages were caused by acts of the State Road
Commission to property owned by the landowner, which
was later taken by this condemnation action. The acts
were so severe that they amounted to an actual taking
of the property, but more than 2 % years pass before
the State eventually files an eminent domain proceeding. This is not a new or a separate cause of action, as
in the Parker case, or as found by the District Court
in the instant case, but damages arising out of the same
cause of action; therefore, they cannot be considered as
ancillary to, or a part of, any other proceeding. The
State of Utah having waived its right to immunity by
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filing a condemnation action, must pay for all damages
arising out of the taking of this property. I t would not
be reasonable to adjudicate only part of the damages
before the Court and save a portion to be heard at a
later time, before the Board of Examiners, even if we
were to say that it were a separate cause of action where,
as in this case, the acts amount to a "taking," this
becomes a matter that can, and should, be adjudicated
before the Courts and the Defendants cannot be told
to take their claim to another body. This would create
an unreasonable burden upon the landowner.
Attention is also directed to the State vs. Tedesco
case, cited above, where one of the property owners, not
holding a vested interest in the real property, claimed
damages for losses that he suffered. Here, Justice Henriod again says (at page 789):
"Since we hold that at best the defendant may
have had a contract right in the development
of prospective residential land, which, if carried
out, would have enhanced the value of its land,
such a claim cannot be made the basis for intervention in a condemnation suit brought by the
state against property in which defendant has
no vested interest. This being so, the defendant
could not sue the sovereign for the damages
claimed here, and the State's defense of sovereign immunity is well taken in this case."
I n the instant case, however, Defendants had a
vested interest in the property and were involved in a
condemnation action solely concerning that property.
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As stated in the Springville Banking Co. vs. Burton
case, cited above, this "imposes a special burden on one
not shared by the public generally. . . . "
;
The Court in the case of State, by and through its
Engineering Commission vs. Peek, cited above, recognizes the possibility of a case of this nature where Justice
Wade (at page 634) states:
' 'Appellants further argue that failure to
allow such interest constitutes a taking of private
property for a public use without just compensation, in violation of Article I, Sections 7 and
22 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth
and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. There are many cases which allow interest
from the beginning of the condemnation proceedings even though the owner retains possession. Such cases require him to account for the
income, rents and profits of the land during that
period. Some of them cite the above mentioned
Federal Constitutional provisions and State Constitutional provisions similar to ours above cited
in support of such holding. Some of such cases
require a showing on the part of the land owner
that he has been deprived of profits during the
period in question which he would have made
had the suit not been commenced, and that such
profits were not included in the damages which
were awarded. The record here does not show
that such proof was made in this case." (Emphasis added).
I n this case, Defendants have not attempted to
show profits since they would come only from the sale
of lots in the subdivision over a period of time (although
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such evidence was before the District Court, but not
included in the record before this Court), because it
might appear to be too speculative or remote. However,
Defendants have approached this problem from the
point of view of damages suffered in the nature of
interest actually paid on the contract and mortgage
balances, in the acquisition of the land, and interest paid
on moneys invested, during the 3 ^ year total period
that the Defendants were delayed, as well as the other
expenses incurred by reason of this delay. These are
realistic figures that can be computed (R 33-34; also,
R 300 to 303, Exhibit D 37) and are not remote or
speculative. These figures represent actual loss in dollars
and cents to the Defendants. They represent a cost; an
actual expenditure that Defendants would not have incurred if it were not for the acts of the Plaintiff.

CONCLUSION
I n conclusion, we respectfully submit that these
damages represent a loss not included in the verdict of
the jury — these items were never submitted to the jury
and were not considered by them in arriving at their
verdict. The Court refused to present them to the jury
and at the special hearing, refused to allow these damages. If the Defendants are not awarded damages arising out of the acts of the Plaintiff, in depriving Defendants of their property for such a long period of time,
then the State has effectively taken their property with40
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out compensation, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and
Article I, Sections 7 and 22 of the Constitution of Utah,
POINT III. DEFENDANTS ARE ENT I T L E D TO T H E COST O F T H E E N G I N E E R ING, P L A N N I N G AND D E V E L O P I N G OF
T H E F I N A L L I N E N P L A T OF RANDOM
W O O D S S U B D I V I S I O N , A S T H E S A M E CONS T I T U T E S A N I M P R O V E M E N T TO T H E
P R O P E R T Y , U N D E R 78-34-10 (1), U.C.A. 1953.
Our statute concerning the assessment of damages
in a condemnation action, reads as follows (78-34-10) :
"78-34-10. Compensation and damages—How
assessed—The court, jury or referee must hear
such legal evidence as may be offered by any
of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon,
must ascertain and assess:
(1) The value of the property sought to be
condemned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and every
separate estate or interest therein; and if it
consists of different parcels, the value of each
parcel and of each estate or interest therein
shall be separately assessed." (Emphasis
added).
The words "appertaining to the realty" has reference to any unpfovement Ji^Jjonging to or used in cqnriectioh witTTthe land. See Volume 3 A of Words and
P&ases, page 378T
The creation of a subdivision is an involved and
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intricate process, requiring technical and artistic skills
of a highly trained engineer, as well as the practical
approach of saleability of the lots thus created, that is
acquired by real estate developers only after years of
experience. A subdivision is a special improvement that
is planned and prepared for the particular land in question and the completed product depends on numerous
factors, viz., zoning, the development of the surrounding
terrain, location of existing streets, canals, the slope of
the terrain, trees, location of sewer and water, and the
overall estimated cost of installing the off-site improvements that become part of the subdivision. In this
respect, it is as much appurtenant to the ground as a
home or building and, in most cases, will be much more
tailored to fit a particular piece of ground, than a building or a home.
W e have been unable to locate any cases, either for
or against the proposition that a fully developed proposed subdivision plat is appurtenant to the real property, in the sense used by the above statute, but it
seems, in analyzing the meaning of the word "appurtenant" and its use in this statute, that the final linen
plat of Random Woods Subdivision became appurtenant by reason of the specialized nature of the final
product. Therefore, the cost of creating the subdivision
should be used as part of the value of the improvements
to the land.
Clearly, after the subdivision plat has been completed (and it makes no difference whether the plat has
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3een recorded, or not) the ground has more value than
it had prior to the creation of the subdivision. Because
the prospective buyer realizes this is work he will not
have to do, or expenses that he will not have to incur,
it would, therefore, increase the value of the land; at
least by the cost of the development of the subdivision
plat and, in all likelihood, would increase the value considerably more, because after the subdivision plat has
been developed, the buyer is able to compute with more
certainty the expenses of installing off-site improvements, and he will be able to estimate with greater certainty, the value of the individual lots and his eventual
profit or loss in the overall development.

CONCLUSION
W e conclude, under these circumstances, that the
terms "appertaining to the realty," refers to and includes
the costs of developing a subdivision plat, and Defendants should be awarded the sum of $6,049.52 as additional damages in this action.
Respectfully submitted,

KIRTON & BETTILYON
VERDEN E. BETTILYON
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys

for

Appellants
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